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At the turn of the century, Argentina experienced a serious economic crisis, brought 
about by the forced abandonment of the monetary convertibility regime and characterized 
by sharp changes in relative prices and income, as well as by widespread breaches of 
contracts.4 This economic crisis proved to be different from previous crises, however, as 
Argentina managed to recover quickly and significantly (see Graph 2.1). 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Secretaría de Programación Económica. 
The recovery presents some exceptional features. At few times in Argentina’s 
economic history has Argentina had such external and fiscal surpluses. More importantly, 
for the purposes of this study, Argentina’s tax burden is far higher than ever before. 
Understanding these historic trends is necessary to our study of the characteristics, 
strengths, weaknesses and reforms of Argentina’s tax system.  The second section of this 
chapter, which serves as an introduction to this study, examines the central features of 
Argentina’s fiscal situation from a historical viewpoint.  Next, we present an explanation 
of the particular institutional characteristics of Argentina’s federalism, which is necessary 
to the study of Argentina’s tax system. Lastly, the next section places the Argentine tax 
system in context, introducing the principal features of taxation in Latin America.  
The main body of this chapter includes a detailed analysis of the evolution of 
Argentine tax level and structure, the key stylized characteristics of this structure, and the 
principal challenges that Argentina continues to face.  Finally, readers who are interested in 
the specific details of the system will find a more exhaustive explanation of the technical 
characteristics of the tax system in the Appendix.  
 
The Economic Evolution and Its Impact on the Financing of the Public Sector: the 
Fiscal Deficit 
 
The Fiscal Situation: A Historical Perspective 
  
A proper evaluation of Argentina’s fiscal situation in the 1990s requires a wide historical 
perspective. Argentina’s public sector reached the 1990s with longstanding structural 
imbalances and brief periods of surpluses which, as a result of successful stabilization 
programs, generally coincided with extraordinary increased revenues. This increase in 
revenues was due, in large part, to improved tax collection during periods characterized 
by sharp decreases in inflation rates and some lags in tax payments (the ‘Tanzi effect’). 
Likewise, the highest deficits have coincided with the deterioration of revenues during 
macroeconomic crises, considering the relative stability of primary spending due to 
budget rigidity. In sum, fiscal evolution has been closely associated with the 
macroeconomic evolution.  
An examination of the evolution of primary and total revenues since 1961 
demonstrates the magnitude of the long-term fiscal deficits. In addition to the deep deficits 
that coincided with serious macroeconomic crises (1975, 1981-83, 1989-90 and 2001-02), 
primary and total deficits constituted approximately 2.1 percent and 4.1 percent of GDP, 
respectively. However, this was due to two clearly different situations.  
Until 1990, the deficit without privatizations, with partial financing from the 
inflationary tax, hovered around 5.8 percent of GDP. During the 1990s, the deficit dropped 
to 2.1 percent of GDP and revenues from privatizations were 1.7 percent of GDP. At the 
same time, the primary balance improved from -3.5 percent of GDP for the 1961-1990 
period (annual average) to 0.5 percent surplus of GDP. On the basis of the information 
presented in Table 2.1 and Graph 2.2, it may be concluded that the public sector has shown 
an important adjustment process of its imbalances in the long term. This does not mean that 
the persistent imbalances, especially those resulting from debt service, were easier to finance 
in the convertibility period, when there was no inflationary tax. 
 
Graph 2.2. Non-financial Federal Public Sector Balance 















































































Overall balance Primary balance
 
  Source:  Own elaboration on the basis of data from the Ministry of Economy and 
ECLAC, Buenos Aires office. 
 
 
Table 2.1. Non-financial Federal Public Sector Balance, 1961-2000 
(Annual average as a percentage of GDP) 
 









1961 - 1970 (3.46) (2.61) (3.86) (3.01) 
1971 - 1980 (6.70) (5.13) (6.91) (5.34) 
1981 - 1990 (6.43) (2.85) (6.61) (3.03) 
1991 - 2001 (1.65) 0.50 (2.14) 0.01 
2002 - 2004 1.16 2.94 1.15 2.93 
 
1961 - 1990 (5.53) (3.53) (5.79) (3.79) 
 
1961 - 2004 (4.11) (2.08) (4.41) (2.38) 
 
  Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from the Ministry of Economy and ECLAC, 
Buenos Aires office 
 
Throughout the four decades prior to the 2001 crisis, the government undertook 
various attempts to restrict the level of capital spending and, in some periods, operating 
spending (personnel and assets and services).5 In addition to debt service, there were 
another two sets of spending that exerted increased pressure:  pensions and spending 
related to fiscal and financial relations with the provinces. Taking into account the federal 
nature of Argentina, we believe the evolution of federal and province accounts should be 
disaggregated. Regardless of the seriousness of many fiscal problems affecting the 
provinces, we can better understand the dominant character of the fiscal evolution of the 
Central Government through an explanation of the evolution of the consolidated public 
accounts6 (Graph 2.3).  
 
Graph 2.3. Evolution of the Consolidated Balance of the Nation and the Provinces 
(As a percentage of GDP) 
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Overall balance Primary balance  
 
  Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from the Ministry of Economy and 
ECLAC, Buenos Aires office. 
 
 
The Fiscal Situation Since the Early 1990s 
 
The evolution of fiscal revenues in the 1990s was a determining factor in the late 2001 
economic crisis. But, since fiscal problems cannot be attributed to a single factor, tax 
policy and traditional difficulties to deal with tax evasion share the menu of fiscal 
deficiencies together with finances of the provinces, privatizations, pension reform, debt 
management among others. While the early 1990s were considered a period of sizeable 
reforms in terms of public intervention, longstanding public policy problems in 
education, health, the pension system, infrastructure (to mention the most important) 
persisted. Thus the extent to which reforms helped should be questioned.7 
In aggregate terms, the following phenomena stand out: the importance of 
revenues from privatizations in the first half of the 1990s,8 the growing deficits that 
began in 1993, and the growing gap between total and primary balance, which high
increased debt interests.  
lights 
Some of the macroeconomic factors that helped create a solvent fiscal situation 
during the early nineties were reversed after 1994 – international interest rates bounced 
back slightly and the recession, unleashed by the unfavorable external shock that 
followed Mexico’s devaluation, greatly influenced collection trends, especially as from 
1995. However, two other factors closely linked to fiscal policy decisions explain fiscal 
imbalances. First, the government was unable to manipulate the nominal exchange rate 
and thus sought to partially offset the trade sectors’ loss of competitiveness by reducing 
taxes and resuming tax reimbursements on exports. The most important measure 
undertaken was the reduction in employers’ taxes that financed social security. The 
second factor resulted from the negative impact of pension system reform, which will be 
discussed in a later section. Despite these emergency measures and the temporary 
recovery of the economic activity that began in 1996, the public sector continued to show 
imbalances that it tried to counter with a series of various and partial tax reforms.  
 
The Fiscal Situation after the Crisis 
 
  
The features that characterized Argentina’s fiscal policy before the 2001 crisis are 
different from those that have prevailed in the period after the crisis, during which 
exceptional growth in the trade balance and in the net fiscal surplus were achieved. In 
2004, the public sector’s fiscal income showed a surplus at 2.6 percent9 of GDP and such 
surplus was estimated to have increased to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2005. These data show 
the vast improvement in public accounts after the 2001-2002 crisis. In 2002, this 
improvement resulted from a decrease in spending as a percentage of GDP in proportion 
to revenue growth. Such spending cuts primarily arose from a reduction in the real value 
of public sector wages, pension payments and debt interests. The first two changes 
resulted from the depreciation of the exchange rate that occurred when the convertibility 
system was abandoned. Between 2001 and 2002, the nominal exchange rate increased by 
200 percent and 130 percent in real terms while the public sector’s salaries and pension 
payments remained virtually constant. Improvement subsequent to 2002 resulted from the 
increased growth of tax revenues relative to spending.  
Together, these factors generated the previously-mentioned primary surplus, 
despite the creation of a new social assistance program to deal with the social costs of the 
crisis.  
Never before in Argentina’s history has its tax burden been so high. This is due, 
in part, to emergency taxes, half of which came from export duties, and overall, which 
amounted to a total of 4.6 percent of GDP in 2004. However, the significant growth of 
traditional taxation (e.g., VAT, income, and payroll taxes) confirms the usual assumption 
that tax administration efforts are more efficient during periods of economic recovery.  
 
 
Political Structure of the Federal Government: The Tax Powers of Each Level of 
Government and the Revenue Sharing System 
 
A complete discussion of the Argentine tax system must include certain relevant 
characteristics of Argentina’s institutional organization. Argentina is a federal country 
comprised of twenty-four highly autonomous provinces, fourteen of which existed before 
the national organization that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. Likewise, 
Argentina’s National Constitution sets forth that the provinces retain all powers not 
specifically delegated to the federal government. As a consequence, the federal 
government has full responsibility in matters of foreign affairs, minting, trade regulations, 
domestic and international navigation, and defense. Powers in certain other policy areas – 
among them, justice, primary education, and social security – are shared. Because the 
institutional framework is imprecise in its delegation of these powers to the varying 
levels of government, responsibilities have been reallocated numerous times during the 
past three decades. These processes of reallocation, not always orderly and transparent, 
have made the nation-provinces-municipalities relationship more complex.  
 With respect to the powers of taxation, the National Constitution, in article 75, 
subsection 2, defines federal and provincial tax powers by stating that indirect taxes, with 
the exception of import and export fees which are exclusively federal, are shared by both 
levels of government. Direct taxes fall exclusively under the auspices of the provinces, 
but the federal government is not precluded from levying direct taxes during a limited 
term and on condition that national security and defense requires it.  
In practice, the federal government collects most taxes while revenues are shared. 
The provinces retain four main taxes (the real estate tax, automobile tax, stamp tax, and 
gross income tax), which allow them to collect enough revenue to cover, on average, 
approximately 40 percent of their expenses and finance the rest of their expenses through 
indebtedness and transfers from the central government. In Argentina, the tax revenue 
collected by sub-national governments has not grown in proportion to their spending. 
This has resulted in a growing gap between spending and revenues at a sub-national 
level, which has increased tensions between the nation and the provinces.  
From a long-term perspective, the imbalances between jurisdictional structures of 
spending and revenues (tax and non-tax revenues) were not very significant up until the 
1980s (Graph 2.4). Before the decentralization of schools and hospitals in the late 1960s, 
the central government collected and spent similar percentages of the total budget. Since 
the 1980s, however, the highest concentration of revenues managed by the federal 
government and the decentralization of spending has given rise to pressure on the tax-
sharing system and increased tension between the federal and provincial governments, as 





































































National Government Provinces Municipalities  
Source: Cetrángolo and  Jiménez (2004). 
 
The allocation of taxes between levels of government should attempt to meet the 
needs of often divergent goals. On one hand, it is true that, in theory, sub-national 
governments can better meet their citizens’ preferences when local taxes allow costs of 
providing certain assets and services by the local government to be internalized. 
However, various reasons make it difficult to allocate tax powers to sub-national 
governments in such a proportion to fully finance their growing delivery of assets and 
services. Therefore, while there is a theoretical agreement about a necessary symmetry 
between spending and tax powers, in practice, there are few taxes that can be 
decentralized without a significant loss of efficiency and fairness.  
This point is of particular importance in almost every country in the region, whose 
economies are characterized by deep regional productivity disparities. As Graph 2.5 shows, 
Argentina presents an extremely imbalanced regional productive structure.  
 


















































































































































Source: Graphic regional overview. ECLAC, Buenos Aires. 
The relation between the per-capita income of the Province of Santa Cruz (the 
richest in terms of this indicator) and the Province of Formosa (the poorest) in Argentina 
is 8.6 times.10 This disparity in regional terms not only impacts the construction of 
equalization schemes, but also limits certain decentralization attempts. Thus, such 
disparities among regions translate into different tax bases and institutional capabilities. 
All these factors highlight the importance of revenue-transfer schemes to sub-national 
governments.  
Additionally, the process of decentralization of social expenditures and the 
concentration of revenues in the central government exert pressure on financial transfer 
systems to homogenously provide public goods while paying attention to fairness. These 
data rule out any attempt to make any headway in fiscal co-responsibility projects (which 
does not mean ignoring the need to transfer some tax powers to provinces). Graph 2.6 
shows the high degree of correlation between the quality standards in the public provision 
of health and education and the degree of development relative to each jurisdiction.11 
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Infant Mortality Rate, by Ranking 
 
  Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from the Ministery of Education, 
Science and Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y  Técnica, Ministerio de Salud y 
Ambiente de la Nación and ECLAC, Buenos Aires Office. 
 
 Consequently, it is essential that any alternative policy attempting to improve 
fairness in Argentina should include mechanisms that help equalize regional differences, 
in particular those related to decentralized social spending. An efficient tax-sharing 
system, with explicit goals and with adequate incentives, can make up for the deficiency 
present in sub-national tax systems and thus finance the functions assigned to these 
governments.  
In order to complete this introduction to Argentina’s federalism, the role of local 
governments will be briefly mentioned. The National Constitution defines for each 
province the elements of its own municipal regime. The provinces’ constitutions and 
municipal organic laws set forth different areas of competence for municipalities – the 
goals and policies of the local governments deal mainly with basic urban services such as 
garbage collection and public lighting. With regard to taxes, only municipalities of 
certain provinces are authorized to collect them (see Table 2.2).  
















Buenos Aires 0.0           
Catamarca 0.9         X 
Córdoba 5.5     X     
Corrientes 1.3         X 
Chaco 12.5 X X X     
Chubut 37.5 X X X X   
Entre Ríos 0.0           
Formosa 10.5 X   X     
Jujuy 4.5     X     
La Pampa 0.0           
La Rioja 0.0           
Mendoza 0.0           
Misiones 4.1         X 
Neuquén 12.4     X     
Río Negro 0.0           
Salta 8.2 X   X     
San Juan 0.0           
San Luis 0.0           
Santa Cruz 18.8 X   X     
Santa Fe 0.0           
Stgo. del Estero 0.0           
Tucumán 0.0           
Tierra del Fuego 18.5 X   X     
Total 1.5           
 
 
The Level and Structure of Taxation  
 
A Global Overview of the Tax Burden 1932 and 2004 
An overview of the level of the tax burden since 1950 is presented in Graph 2.7, which 
shows that Argentina may be considered to have a medium to high tax revenue 
coefficient relative to other Latin American countries, especially until the early 1990s, 
when it first exceeded 20 percent of GDP. A global analysis of the evolution of 
Argentina’s tax system cannot be performed without taking into consideration tax 
revenues from sub-national governments, particularly at the province level,12 which have 
represented approximately 3.5 percent of GDP and which have exhibited a trend of 
growth. 
Graph 2.7. Level of Total Collection (Federal and Provincial Revenues Including 















































































































Nation revenues Provinces revenues
From a longer-term perspective, the federal tax revenue13 remained below 10 
percent of GDP until the mid-1940s, moving to a new level of 14 percent between 1950 
and 1990 and increasing again thereafter (see Table 2.3). This is in contrast with the early 
expansion of government activities and the consolidation of the Argentine welfare state 
throughout the last century. An important aspect that should therefore be pointed out is 
that such expansion of the State was not in line with a similar evolution in traditional tax 
collection. Customs revenues, taxes on fuels to finance road building and the construction 
of hydroelectric plants, the initial surplus of the pension system, the inflationary tax, the 
indebtedness, and privatization have been, throughout Argentina’s history, important 
sources of revenues that made the expansion of the public sector possible without the 
concurrent development of tax collection. In the past few years, extraordinary revenue 
sources gradually faded away, which made it even more important to take steps to 
strengthen traditional taxes. Export duties may be the last of this kind of resources and 
will be explained as later on.  
 
 1932-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-01 2002-04
(As a percentage of GDP) 
Income. benefits and 
capital gains 
0.95 2.56 3.37 2.35 1.37 1.02 2.54 3.93 
Assets 0.32 0.25 0.47 0.54 0.61 0.54 0.35 0.59 
Taxes on goods and 
services 




3.27 1.03 0.44 1.77 1.83 1.73 0.92 2.71 
Social security 
contributions 
1.37 3.01 4.86 4.20 4.51 2.94 4.31 2.90 
Others 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.40 0.49 0.15 
Federal gross tax 
revenues 
9.43 10.60 14.01 13.86 13.97 12.80 17.36 19.86 
(As a percentage of the total) 
Income. benefits and 
capital gains 
10.0 24.2 24.1 17.0 9.8 8.0 14.6 19.8 
Assets 3.4 2.3 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.2 2.0 3.0 
Taxes on goods and 
services 




34.7 9.7 3.2 12.7 13.1 13.5 5.3 13.6 
Social security 
contributions 
14.5 28.4 34.7 30.3 32.3 23.0 24.8 14.6 
Others 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 3.1 2.9 0.7 
Federal gross tax 
revenues 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
After a sharp reduction during the crisis in late 2001, tax revenue showed a strong 
expansion during 2003 and 2004 (Graph 2.8), due to facts related to the economic 
policies adopted analyzed in more detail later on, especially regarding export duties and 
other regulations that impacted corporate income.  
Some aspects regarding Argentina’s tax structure should be highlighted (Table 
2.3), such as fluctuations in social security contributions, which peaked in the 1950s and 
the 1970s, after which they declined. These contributions went from 30 percent of total 
income to a mere 15 percent of present day income. This issue will be dealt with in a later 
section. 
We also can observe that the evolution of Argentina’s income tax, unlike that of 
other Latin American countries, reached its heyday during the 1940s and 1950s, then 





Graph 2.8: Level of Federal Collection (Federal Taxes and Social Security), 1932-2004 




The Currency Board Period 1991-2001: An Endless Process of Tax Reforms 
 
During the period of the convertibility regime (1991-2001) the federal government’s tax 
revenue reached around 17 percent of GDP (on average) and the consolidated tax burden 
– including provinces and municipalities – reached an average of 21 percent, with a 
decrease after the tequila crisis (1995). Tax revenue subsequently increased to 21 percent 
of GDP, however, highlighting the fact that collection is very sensitive to macroeconomic 
shocks.  
Since the beginning of this period, tax collection showed a substantial change. 
Initially, the convertibility plan coexisted with the tax structure resulting from the 






















































































































National taxes Social security
from the sharp drop in the inflation rate. In subsequent years, economic authorities began 
introducing constant reforms in the tax system.14 
In the 1990s, the tax structure was characterized by its deep initial concentration. 
In 1993, the first main taxes (VAT, income, and contributions to the social security 
system) represented between 75 percent and 80 percent of the total tax revenues. Of this 
total amount, VAT represented 40 percent. The most important measures taken in the 
first years of the 1990s were: the broadening of the VAT base (more widespread than in 
1980); low income tax rates; the abolition of taxes on exports; reform of the tax on fuels 
accompanying the deregulation of the sector (which led to the gradual simplification of 
the system of specific allocation funds), and the abolition of minor taxes.   
As the reforms progressed, the government became more pragmatic. While 
maintaining the basic orientation, it ruled out the proposal of reducing tax rates inspired 
in the “Laffer effect” and, on several occasions, increased the rates of VAT and the 
income tax shared with the most important provinces. As a result, federal tax revenues 
grew by 64 percent between 1991 and 1992 – VAT collection grew by 160 percent while 
the income tax quadrupled, encouraging the concentration mentioned before.  
In addition, tax reform was sustained by a strengthening program that included 
information generated by a sales-invoicing system, new penalty provisions, and a broad 
withholding-at-source system that facilitated the collection of the two taxes previously 
mentioned. The concentration of collection in these taxes made revenues highly sensitive 
to the evolution of macroeconomic variables. This sensitivity was costly after 1995, when 
the domestic economy suffered from the unfavorable external shock that followed 
Mexico’s devaluation.  
After mid-1994, a new phase of public accounts started – in the third quarter of 
1994, the first negative fiscal results were observed, which coincided with pension reform 
(which will be dealt with later on) and which occurred months before the drop in 
traditional tax revenues that was due to the recession.  
The federal government was forced to take emergency measures, which in some 
cases meant reviewing actions previously undertaken. Such measures included an 
increase in VAT rates (from 18 percent to 21 percent), the partial review of the initial 
decrease in payroll taxes paid by employers, an increase in imports fees, a reduction of 
reimbursements for exports and the subsidy on capital assets, and a broadening of the 
income and personal assets tax base. However, despite these measures and the gradual 
recovery of the economic activity level which began during half of 1996, the public 
sector continued to show imbalances. The persistence of the deficit led to additional 
measures applied mainly to revenues. These measures included an increase in taxes on 
fuel and the resumption of the tax on diesel fuel. The additional revenues resulting from 
these reforms were then applied to the social security system. The 1998 tax reform was 
aimed at strengthening tax revenues. To achieve this goal, the government broadened the 
VAT base and created taxes on minimum presumed income, on paid interests and on the 
cost of corporate indebtedness, on automobiles, motorcycles, ships and planes (destined 
to increase teachers’ salaries), and the Monotributo (a tax paid by the self-employed). 
Through this reform, the government could increase tax revenues for an amount closer to 
1% of GDP. Although some of the adopted measures have significant importance to 
enhance taxation (as the broadening of VAT base), others, on the contrary, have to be 
released sooner or later as they implied an increase in the investment cost for enterprises 
(tax on paid interests, for example). Additionally, tax on minimum presumed income and 
Monotributo have remained in the tax system, their convenience is highly debatable. 
 
 Thus, the initial attempt to create a tax system that concentrated on only a few 
taxes had to be reversed in order to deal with the fiscal crises. By late 1999, the newly 
inaugurated government passed a tax package that included several reforms of VAT, 
which broadened the VAT base and abolished certain exemptions. Additionally, the use 
of differential rates was extended, levying 10.5 percent on several services. The evolution 
of this tax during the 1990s shows that once the positive effect in the first years of the 
decade – coinciding with the launching of the convertibility plan – had passed, the 
subsequent, significant increases in tax rates and bases only managed to maintain the 
level of collection.  
In 2000, the government reformed the income tax, broadening the tax base 
through the reduction of the non-taxable minimum income, tax deductions for family 
benefits, and special deductions. An emergency tax on high income was created and tax 
rates on personal assets exceeding $200,000 were increased. Additionally, some internal 
tax rates were increased. These reforms generated additional tax revenues of around 1.8 
percent of GDP.  
In May 2001, the government introduced new tax reforms whose goals were not 
quite clear. On the one hand, the government created a tax on debits and credits in current 
accounts; it simultaneously launched competitiveness plans. These plans were based on 
agreements signed by chambers of commerce, the federal government and provincial 
governments, through which some productive activities were aided in order to stimulate 
the economy, but which reduced collection at a faster pace than the consumption drop. In 
addition to such plans, the tax paid by sector producing capital assets was reduced by half 
and the export regime was applied to all the producers of such assets in respect to the 
VAT tax credit. 1 
In sum, regardless of the Argentine government’s initial intention to simplify the 
tax system, subsequent fiscal emergency situations forced the government to enact 
several reforms that resulted in a heterogeneous and highly complex tax system, which 
also affected the distribution of the funds. Both pension reform and the troubled financial 
relations between the nation and the provinces are two central factors in this story.  
 
Coming out of the Crisis 2002-2004 
 
Beginning in 2002 and continuing to the present day, as a consequence of the measures 
adopted due to the economic ‘crisis’ following the recognition of financial insolvency by the 
government, the Argentine government adopted several tax measures that strongly impacted 
tax collection. These measures moved tax collection from the characteristic 20-22 percent of 
GDP in the 1990s to 26.5 percent in 2004.  
A significant part of this increase is due to the introduction of export duties that 
generated almost 2.5 percent of GDP. This emergency tax responds to the federal 
government’s need to engage the peso’s extraordinary devaluation that occurred after the 
crisis.  
The strong increase in VAT and the broadening of the financial debit and credit tax 
base and its rate rise also exerted some influence on the increase of tax revenue as a 
                                                 
1 Cetrángolo, O. and Jimenez, J. P. (2003), Chapter III. 
percentage of GDP; other influential measures included a strong increase in the corporate 
income revenue of around 2 percentage points of GDP. Corporate tax revenue was up by 
close to 70 percent relative to the pre-crisis period, partly due to the fact that the government 
refused to apply regulations regarding balance adjustments resulting from inflation in 2002 
and to the higher income of oil companies, as a result of an increase in oil prices.  
 We can see, therefore, that the increase in the tax burden is sustained by single-
occurrence impacts on permanent taxes (corporate income) or by increases that arise from 
temporary taxes (export duties and banking debits). This reinforces the thesis that the 
volatility of the tax system increases in response to changes in macroeconomic 
circumstances.  
 Nevertheless, we cannot but mention that since mid-2003, this increase in revenue 
has been sustained, perhaps as a result of greater efforts in improving the efficiency of tax 
administration that accompanied the economic recovery.  
 This long-term analysis allows us to find the structural roots of Argentina’s 
financing problem, from which we infer that the structural imbalances observed from a 
long-term perspective have not been covered by an adequate tax structure, even with 












Table 2.4. Federal Taxes and Social Security, 1932-2004  
(Averages in decades) 
 
 1932-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-01 2002-04
As a percentage of GDP 
Federal taxes 8.07  7.59  9.15  9.66  9.46  9.86  13.05  16.96  
Social security 1.37  3.01  4.86  4.20  4.51  2.94  4.31  2.90  
Federal gross tax 
revenues 
9.43 10.60 14.01 13.86 13.97 12.80 17.36 19.86 
As a percentage of the total 
Federal taxes 85.52  71.64  65.30  69.72  67.72  77.03  75.18  85.40  
Social security 14.48  28.36  34.70  30.28  32.28  22.97  24.82  14.60  
Federal gross tax 
revenues 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Main Features of the Present Situation 
 
Before embarking upon the analysis of the specific challenges that face Argentina’s tax 
system, we turn to a discussion of eight stylized factors that characterized the evolution 
of the country’s tax structure throughout history.  
 
Sustained Growth of Consumers Taxes 
 
Until the 1950s, consumer goods taxes were not highly significant; in time, however, they 
increased to total approximately 2.0-2.5 percent of GDP in the late 1980s and 







Graph 2.9. Sales Tax and VAT, 1932-2004 























































































































































Sales tax Value added tax  
 
Table 2.5.VAT Productivity,1 1991 – 2004 
 1991 1994 1997 2001 2002 2003 20043 
Revenue (as % of GDP) 3.75  6.75  6.99  5.71  4.88  5.57  6.92  
Tax Rate2 (%) 16.00  18.00  21.00  21.00  21.00  21.00  21.00  
Productivity 0.235  0.375  0.333  0.272  0.232  0.265  0.330  
 
Thus, it is clear that the government, when faced with a constant lack of 
resources, systematically resorted to indirect taxation to improve the level of tax 
revenues. In this context, we should highlight the behavior of VAT, which, although 
implemented in 1975, only experienced a dramatic increase in revenues as of 1992. 
Since the beginning of 1990, the evolution of VAT rates was dominated by an 
overall rate, which at that time reached a minimum level of 13 percent, which was around 
the level established in the first months following implementation of the VAT.  In the last 
few years, the dominant trend in designing the VAT has been towards increasing both its 
base and rates, allowing revenues to increase significantly, both in absolute terms as well 
as in relation to other taxes. After reaching 13 percent in February 1990, the tax rate rose 
to its current 21 percent level in 1997. 
 As for the tax base, a new reform eliminated almost every tax exemption on 
goods, with the exception of books, magazines, newspapers, bread, milk, and medicine.  
The VAT was also extended to services performed by banks and other financial 
institutions2, insurance, private health insurance plans, artistic, cultural, sporting and 
cinematographic events, and personal services related to these events, and transportation 
of people and freights.  Services provided by the state, provinces, municipalities, 
educational entities, as well as by public health insurance plans and stock exchanges, 
were excluded.  
In recent years, due to a combination of base-broadening and increased tax rates, 
revenues reached levels close to 7 percent of GDP. In addition, we must mention the 
relevance of the turnover taxes applied by provincial governments, which are identified 
as “Impuesto a los ingresos brutos” and are applied to each stage of the production 
process, with the exception of agriculture and cattle breeding. 
 
Gradual Loss of Resources from Import Duties 
 
The gradual loss of resources from import duties since the mid 1940s, accentuated during 
the 1950s and, subsequently with the trade expansion, was promoted by the convertibility 
                                                 
2 This reform modified the previous system of VAT determination on these institutions. Till then, the tax 
had been calculated on the basis of the remuneration of factors and the reform implied the adoption of the 
usual system of determination through debits and credits. 
period. This general pattern first occurred in Argentina before occurring in several other 
countries of the region (Graph 2.10). 
 
Graph 2.10. Foreign Trade Taxes, 1932-2004 



























































































Intermittent but Significant Presence of Export Taxes 
 
Throughout Argentine history, revenues resulting primarily from the export of 
agricultural goods have contributed substantially to the financing of the state. In the days 
following the 2001 crisis, this took the shape of export duties charged by customs, 
similarly to other historic periods when the rate of exchange was extraordinarily devalued 
to meet the foreign crisis, as was observed in Graph 2.10. In other periods of history, the 
Central Bank generated these resources through the introduction of multiple exchange 
rates. 
This emergency tax has two additional advantages: first, it reduces the impact of 
devaluation on the domestic price of commodities, many of which make up a substantial 
part of the mass consumer basket. This results in the improvement in real wages. Second, 
due to the fact that these revenues are, in accordance with the Constitution, not shared 
with the provinces, they bring quick relief to the central government’s accounts.  
 
Poor Performance of Income Taxation  
 
Despite possessing an expanded middle class, a high level of urban concentration, a 
reasonable level of income per capita, and a Gini coefficient below 0.4, Argentina has 
never managed to develop an income tax that generates much revenue (Graph 2.11). 
Although it pulled some weight between 1945 and 1955, this tax lost its participation in 
the taxation structure following that 10-year period and for the next three decades and 
only began to recover its standing in the nineties. Nevertheless, we should note that a 












Graph 2.11. Income Tax, 1932-2004 





























































































































































On profits On income
 
 
Likewise, and considering it is a common characteristic in the whole region, the 
weight of the income tax burden has rested primarily on the strong participation of 
corporate income tax, and as regards to the personal income tax, most of its revenue 
comes from wages. Then, income from financial activities (dividends, interests and 
others)  have scarce participation in total personal income tax. Table 2.6 describes this 
phenomenon and evidences the weakness of the system in achieving its goals in respect 
of income distribution, since there is not much that the state can do with a personal 
income tax that has no incidence on non-wage income. 
 
 
Table 2.6. Personal and Corporate Income Tax, 1992-2004 
Tax Revenues1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20042 
As a percentage of GDP 
Taxes on income, profits,  
  and capital gains 
1.61 2.03 2.44 2.51 2.57 2.90 3.21 3.56 3.98 3.99 3.04 4.30 5.26 
Individuals 0.33 0.57 0.75 0.79 0.98 0.92 0.99 1.08 1.39 1.38 1.13 1.33 1.38 
Corporations. and other  
  enterprises 
1.21 1.35 1.56 1.58 1.49 1.78 2.00 2.18 2.31 2.32 1.56 2.64 3.64 
Others unidentifiable 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.24 
As a percentage of total taxes on income, profits, and capital gains 
Taxes on income, profits,  
  and capital gains 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Individuals 20.3 28.2 30.6 31.4 38.1 31.9 30.8 30.3 34.8 34.5 37.2 30.9 26.2 
Corporations and other  
  enterprises 
75.3 66.5 64.0 63.0 58.2 61.3 62.1 61.3 58.2 58.2 51.4 61.4 69.2 
Others unidentifiable 4.4 5.3 5.4 5.6 3.7 6.9 7.0 8.4 7.0 7.2 11.4 7.7 4.6 
Individuals              
As a percentage of total gross tax revenues 
Taxes on income, profits, 
and capital gains 
7.5 9.2 11.1 12.1 12.8 13.9 15.2 16.6 18.3 18.9 15.0 18.1 19.8 
Individuals 1.5 2.6 3.4 3.8 4.9 4.4 4.7 5.0 6.4 6.5 5.6 5.6 5.2 
Corporations and other 
enterprises 
5.6 6.1 7.1 7.6 7.5 8.5 9.4 10.2 10.7 11.0 7.7 11.1 13.7 
Others unidentifiable 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.4 0.9 
 
   Source: Based on data from Direccion Nacional de Investigaciones y Analisis Fiscal 
(Ministry of Economy). 
  1Based on IMF-Government Finance Statistics Manual classification. 
  2Provisional data. 
 
Irrelevance of the Wealth Taxes 
 
As in most countries in the region, taxes at the federal level levied on personal assets 
have not had substantial significance, although to judge their impact, we must also 
consider the role played by provinces and municipalities in this respect.  Property taxes or 
taxes on the holding of real estate account for 25 percent to 30 percent of revenues at the 
lower levels of government, demonstrating that the weight of these provincial taxes on 
personal assets is close to 1.5 percent of GDP. 
Table 2.7. Provincial Taxation, 1990-2004  













1990 1.32 0.64 0.21 0.25 0.07 2.48 
1991 1.51 0.66 0.29 0.31 0.06 2.82 
1992 1.95 0.66 0.31 0.37 0.24 3.54 
1993 2.12 0.63 0.31 0.40 0.25 3.72 
1994 2.14 0.64 0.33 0.40 0.26 3.76 
1995 2.02 0.61 0.31 0.35 0.26 3.55 
1996 2.02 0.60 0.30 0.35 0.33 3.60 
1997 2.05 0.62 0.32 0.32 0.41 3.72 
1998 2.19 0.63 0.33 0.33 0.42 3.90 
1999 2.20 0.63 0.32 0.32 0.43 3.90 
2000 2.15 0.64 0.29 0.28 0.46 3.82 
2001 2.08 0.61 0.29 0.28 0.37 3.64 
2002 1.97 0.53 0.21 0.23 0.46 3.39 
2003 2.35 0.58 0.23 0.27 0.37 3.81 
2004 2.58 0.59 0.23 0.29 0.35 4.04 
 
  Source: Based on data from  Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las 
Provincias (Ministry of Economy). 
 
Loss of importance of the payroll taxes  
 
After an important increase in payroll tax revenue from the 1930s to the mid-1980s, it 
began to decrease, partly due to the growth of the informal employment market and the 
structural reform to the pension system that introduced individually capitalized accounts 
in 1994. This point is entered into in more detail later on. 
Notwithstanding, this factor of production should be examined, since it is not only 
taxed by social security contributions, but also, the main weight of the tax on personal 
income is levied almost exclusively on salaries.  
Table 2.8. Taxes on Wage and Salaries, 1992-2004 
1992 1996 2000 2004 
















Total taxes on wage and  
  salaries 
5.72  100.00 4.93  100.00 4.79  100.00  4.42  100.00 
Personal income tax 0.33  5.71  0.98  19.85  1.39  28.93  1.38  31.18  
Social security contributions 5.39  94.29  3.95  80.15  3.40  71.07  3.04  68.82  
 
The Use of Emergency or Extraordinary Taxes  
 
The structural weakness of traditional taxes to obtain sufficient revenues to ensure fiscal 
solvency has resulted in the search for emergency or extraordinary revenues by means of 
non-traditional sources. These supplementary taxes, such as taxes on corporate assets and 
financial transactions, have been an important source of financing for Argentina’s public 
sector at various times in history. This use of supplementary taxes is shared by many 
countries in Latin America, as was explained previously. This issue is also treated in 
more detail in a later section. 
 
Significant Tax Expenditures  
 
Another characteristic of the Argentine tax system is its lack of transparency in providing 
promotional tax measures. The amount of benefits granted, which are significant in terms 
of the country’s tax burden, and the methods employed – which include the approval of 
private sector projects, the application of tax deferrals, and the inclusion of VAT among 
the various tax measures implemented – have made the system highly vulnerable to 
evasion and corruption. Moreover, while determining the tax impact of the different 
systems employed is a complex task, it is even more difficult to identify the effects that 
arise from those regimes, since they have never been subject to careful scrutiny and 
evaluation.  
 
The Six Main Challenges of Argentina’s Tax System 
 
We identify six challenges that future Argentine tax discussions must resolve. To ensure 
long-term solvency, the government must undertake the following:  
a. providing an adequate response to problems related to the financing of the 
social security system; 
b. replacement of emergency taxes on corporate assets and taxes on financial 
operations; 
c. substitution of export taxes; 
d. reduction of tax expenditures; 
e. strengthening of the fairness and equity of the tax system; 
f. strengthening of the tax administration.  
 
Providing an Adequate Response to Problems Related to the Financing of the Social 
Security System 
 
Of the Latin American countries, Argentina was one of the first to develop a 
contribution-based social security system that was financed by payroll taxes. The system 
consists of retirement contributions, unemployment insurance, family subsidies, and 
health plans for active and passive employees and their families. Until 1984, when a 
major tax reform was introduced, total charges against salaries for social security 
financing (including employer contributions and employee deductions) added up to 50 
percent of the gross salary. 
It is impossible to understand the dynamics and magnitude of the Argentine fiscal 
crisis in the last quarter century without including a careful analysis of the retirement 
crisis.15 We must emphasize the importance of tax resources reassigned to financing the 
retirement system, due to insufficient revenues collected from specific charges and, at the 
same time, to the impact of these allowances on sub-national finances and the conflict 
between the State and the provinces. 
Several tax assignments for the financing of retirement pensions were introduced 
to improve the sector’s financial situation. During the 1990s, a significant portion of tax 
revenues were assigned to finance the retirement system, substantially affecting tax co-
participation. In Graph 2.12, we see the evolution of retirement contributions as of 1987, 
when they were entirely financed by payroll contributions and deductions. We observe 
both an important increase in retirement expenses during the first years of the decade and 




Graph 2.12. Retirement Payments and Their Financing 









1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Contributions Other financing
 
  Source: Cetrángolo & Grushka (2005). 
 
In the last years of the convertibility program, almost 70 percent of social security 
expenditures were financed by taxes other than payroll taxes. The gap between revenues 
from the taxes intended to finance the social security system and the expenditures of the 
system was one of the primary causes of the solvency problem of the public sector. To 
clarify this point, Table 2.9 shows a decomposition of the deficit of the social security 
system into several sources. It can be seen that the transfer of funds (employee 
contributions) to the new capitalization scheme and a reduction in employer 
contributions, together account for close to 3 percent of the GDP deficit. 
 
Table 2.9. Determining Factors of the Pension System Deficit, 2000 
 Billion $ % of Total % of GDP 
Pension system deficit 9.4 100.0 3.30 
Capitalization system 4.3 45.9 1.52 
Reduction in   
  Contributions 
3.8 40.6 1.34 
Other reasons 1.3 13.5 0.44 
Source: Cetrángolo and Grushka (2005). 
 
The future configuration of the retirement system and its impact on public 
accounts has yet to be defined – in particular, the real level of public sector benefits and 
the future coverage of the senior population.  At the time of the reform of the system, it 
was officially expected that coverage would increase. Instead, however, this coverage 
dropped from 39 percent in October 1994 (measured by the percentage of contributors to 
the system against employment) to 36 percent in May 2000. Consequently, it has become 
imperative to come up with alternative sources of financing.  
 
Replacement of Emergency Taxes on Corporate Assets and Taxes on Financial 
Operations 
 
An aspect particular to Argentina’s tax system, which also reflects a more general trend 
observed in many countries in the region, is the use of extraordinary taxes in emergency 
situations. The structural difficulties faced by Argentina’s tax situation – which has been 
highlighted by both the lack of sufficient revenues for the financing of expenditures and 
for the unsatisfactory development of tax on income, as well as for the difficulties in 
improving efficiency – has led different administrations to resort to the application of 
extraordinary or emergency taxes, such as the tax on corporate assets and the tax on 
financial transactions.  
 
Emergency Taxes on Corporate Assets 
 
Attempts undertaken by Argentina to increase the collection of corporate income tax have 
resulted in extensive legal and administrative difficulties. As a result, Argentina and 
several other countries in the region have implemented alternative determination methods 
that, in some cases, will substitute or complement the assessment of the corporate tax 
base, with the purpose of improving revenues.  
In certain instances, these alternative methods have been based on the application 
of a minimum tax based on assets or, more recently, on gross sales3. As a result, a larger 
fraction of economic activity is subject to the corporate tax, with the individual tax 
applying virtually exclusively to revenue from personal work at a company.  
While in most cases, a rate of around 1 percent on the value of gross assets has 
been used (see Table 2.10), more recently the use of the value of sales or gross income as 
a substitute base has been favored, which has given rise to even more discriminatory 
treatments than the tax itself created. 
                                                 
3In practice, the corporate income tax is a payment in advance of those taxes, in order to allow transnational 
enterprises to fully use the tax credit granted by foreign tax authorities. In other circumstances, and 
especially in more recent experiences, these alternative methods have tended to provide options to the 
taxpayer as to the criterion of the determination to be used, with prior authorization from the tax authority. 
 Table 2.10. Tax on Net Worth, Assets, and Gross Income 
(In percentage points) 
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  Source: Gómez Sabaini (2005). 
  Note: (n/a) Not available. 
 
In practice, the application of these taxes is the undeniable result of the limitations 
Argentina has faced in enforcing the corporate tax. In practice, these minimum taxes 
largely replace the corporate tax, making allocation problems and efficiency worse.  
On the other hand, the strengthening of the income tax would require the ability to 
broaden the base of such tax through the elimination of exemptions and discriminatory 
treatment benefiting certain individuals and/or sectors of activity and the creation of an 
improved tax administration.  
 
Taxes on Financial Operations 
 
Argentina was one of the first countries to implement a tax on ‘banking debits’ when it 
did so in 1983 and again in 2001; other countries in the region (Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Ecuador) followed shortly thereafter.16 Table 2.11 shows the evolution of 
the rates applied in these countries. Additionally, it should be mentioned that in some 
cases, such taxes were applied both to debits and credits, which explains why the 
collection of this type of tax varies between 0.3 percent of GDP for Argentina in 1990 or 
1992 and 3.5 percent for Ecuador in 1999.  
These taxes have essentially been used as an easy source of revenue, transferring 
collection responsibility from the government to financial institutions, so that fiscal 
administrators play a minor role in its collection. While such taxes were introduced with 
the specific purpose of improving revenues in the short term and had an emergency 
nature, their success in generating revenue has resulted in their continued use. 
As pointed out by Coelho, Ebrill, and Summers,17 however, the market response 
shows that there are adverse effects, including a significant degree of financial 
disintermediation. In the case of Argentina, for example, the tax administration found that 
some large companies were using armored trucks to make payments of large amounts of 
money in cash in order to avoid paying this tax. The information presented in Table 2.11 
refers to the different collection productivity in those countries that applied such a tax. In 
this sense, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador have managed to obtain results substantially 
higher than those obtained by Argentina (although in 2001 collection productivity 
improved), Peru, and Venezuela.  
 
Table 2.11. Debit and Credit Operations Taxes 
Country/year Rate Revenue1 Productivity2 
Argentina 
1989 0.70 0.66 0.94 
1990 0.30 0.30 0.99 
1991 1.053 0.91 0.86 
1992 0.603 0.29 0.974 
2001 0.605 1.464 2.43 
Brazil 
1994 0.25 1.06 4.24 
1997 0.20 0.80 4.00 
1998 0.20 0.90 4.50 
1999 0.223 0.83 3.79 
2000 0.343 1.33 3.96 
2001 0.363 1.457 3.97 
Colombia 
1999 0.20 0.73 3.66 
2000 0.20 0.60 3.00 
2001 0.30 0.76 2.53 
Ecuador 
1999 1.00 3.50 6 3.50 
2000 0.80 2.33 6 2.91 
Peru 
1990 1.413 0.59 0.42 
1991 0.813 0.46 0.57 
Venezuela 
1994 0.75 1.30 2.604 
1999-2000 0.50 1.12 2.24 
2002 0.75 1.07 1.43 
 
  Source: Kirilenko and Summers. in ‘Taxation of Financial Intermediation: Theory and 
Practice for Emerging Economies,, edited by Patrick Honohan. World Bank, June 2003.  
  1In percentage of GDP.  
  2Tax revenues in percentage of GDP divided by average legal tax rate.  
  3Average of rates adjusted by the time that each rate was valid.   
  4Adjusted by the time that each rate was valid.  
  5On each side of a transaction. Total rate is 1.2%.  
  6The tax applied to debits and credits. 
 
There are several reasons for this behavior. First, the productivity ratio seems to 
be in inverse proportion with the rate. Second, revenue will be lower when there are close 
substitutes abroad for domestic banks, as in the case of Uruguay for the Argentine 
financial market. Tax avoidance is also more difficult when the use of bank checks as a 
form of payment is more entrenched, as in Brazil.  
While this tax has not proved to be so effective as a revenue source, at present, tax 
authorities consider it an efficient way to capture useful information to control other 
taxes. Essentially, this tax is a selective tax applied to a specific activity – the use of the 
bank checks – though in Argentina, it has come to include not only bank debits but also 
credits with the financial system. This characteristic affects the productivity of the tax 
since in an operation of transfers among accounts, one transaction is being taxed twice, 
which increases collection.  
Experience has shown that as the tax is maintained in the short term, its rate is 
low, and there is a low elasticity in the use of the check, then attempts to avoid such tax 
are expected to be few and far between. If there is a perception that such tax will become 
permanent and rates will be increased, however, the economic “damage” will be 
significant and the number of transactions performed in cash will increase. In turn, this 
has led governments to adopt measures to counteract these deviations, such as the 
limitation of banking endorsements, by establishing maximum amounts for the operations 
of recorded assets and other measures that finally affect the efficiency of the economy.  
 
Substitution of Export Taxes 
 
Argentina has often used export taxes to soften the domestic impact of currency 
devaluations on the price of goods and salaries or to prevent the export sectors from 
reaping extraordinary benefits. During some periods, these resources were not considered 
taxes, but were the result of the introduction of multiple foreign exchange schemes that 
generated quasi-fiscal income in the hands of the Central Bank.  
Although these measures represented considerable fiscal income (see Graph 10), 
they have never generated the massive fiscal revenues such as those revenues collected 
following the 2002 currency devaluation, which increased the rate of exchange from one 
to three in respect of the US dollar.   
The elimination of this extraordinary source of revenue, which amounted to 
almost 3 percent of GDP, poses a serious challenge for the next few years and will also 
impact provincial finances, since, while export duties are only collected by the state 
treasury, all other taxes are subject to a co-participation system and thus affect both the 
national and provincial spheres.   
 
Reduction of Tax Expenditures 
 
It is evident that tax expenditures in force modify tax fairness and equity. They create 
regional or sector “fiscal paradises,” they arbitrarily transfer the tax burden from one 
group of economic agents to others (who are not necessarily in a better position), they 
undermine the ability of some non-promoted provinces to obtain financing, and they open 
the door to tax evasion and fiscal fraud, all of which complicate tax administration.  
Not withstanding this group of provisos, Argentina has made substantial use of 
tax policy, granting some economic sectors (automotive, paper, aluminum, and steel 
industries) and other regional advantages to certain areas of the country, often on the 
basis of geo-political or social reasons (provinces of La Rioja, Catamarca, San Luis, San 
Juan, Tierra del Fuego, among others).  
Unlike promotion systems granted by developed countries (Table 2.12), 
Argentina’s policies have been based on the VAT, shifting the neutrality of the tax and 
opening opportunities for fiscal fraud, which has been substantial in recent times. 
Originally, the system of granting tax benefits was established on the basis of the 
approval of specific projects, instead of utilizing automatic mechanisms, which has 
encouraged administrative corruption and weakened the transparency of the system. 
Likewise, we cannot avoid mentioning that, within the provincial systems, local 
authorities responsible for the application of these projects have often been the very same 
provincial entities that gain from the tax incentives. In fact, they converted them into a 
method for transferring revenues that accounts for one of the more complex aspects of the 
Argentine federal regime. 
 






Capital goods import duties exempted 5 56 
Tax exemption/holiday 20 55 
Investment/reinvestment allowance 30 49 
Lower tax rate 5 45 
VAT exemption for capital goods 0 34 
Accelerated depreciation 30 30 
Raw material import duties exempted 5 30 
VAT exemption for raw materials 5 24 
Duty drawback 5 24 
Export income treated preferentially 0 20 
Loss write-off 0 18 
Reduction in local. municipal taxes/duties 30 18 
VAT exemption on exported inputs 10 18 
Subsidized loans 45 18 
 
  Source: Goodspeed (2004). 
 
From the aforementioned, we can conclude that the fiscal cost of promotion (in 
terms of decreased potential revenues) is merely one of the problems the tax system 
generates and is not the most significant one. Non-compliance, fiscal fraud, modifications 
to economic neutrality, and the negative impact on the relative price of factors 
(effectively lowering the relative cost of capital) constitute economic effects that have not 
been quantified but are, in the long run, much more important than the loss in fiscal 
revenues.  
We therefore consider it necessary to sanction, in an especially vigorous way, all 
detected non-compliance and, at the same time, avoid new investments through dossiers 
that belong to old projects whose benefits have supposedly lapsed. In order to achieve 
this, substantial changes should be made, such as, the establishment of the Argentine 
Ministry of Economy as the regulatory authority for the entire promotion system 
regarding all matters related to taxation. Through the tax collection agency (AFIP), the 
Ministry should exercise the primary faculty of establishing information criteria, 
performing inspections and controls according to estimates, initiating legal proceedings, 
and sanctioning non-compliance. At the same time, it must reorganize the administrative 
entity and establish a department specializing in the control of promoted companies 
nationwide. It is fundamental to ensure that tax administrators have appropriate 
incentives because the control of promoted activities, although not conducive to 
immediate fiscal revenues, is the only way to ensure that these benefits produce the 
desired effects and do not simply become tax evasion pockets.  
With relation to tax deferrals, required warranties should be adopted to ensure 
future payments. Such an undertaking demands the dedication of a great number of 
people and substantial resources. Thus, an alternative to the granting of tax deferrals 
should be found – a more transparent means that will not hinder administrative actions. 
 Beyond these general considerations, an in-depth, detailed analysis of the 
existing situation should be made, since the matter is an administratively complex one 
and, additionally, a series of anomalous situations have appeared and continue to appear 
in this field (e.g., as granting benefits by decree, the ‘substitution’ of beneficiaries and 
objectives in the approved contracts, the ‘renegotiation’ of benefits originally granted, 
and a long series of political, regulatory, and administrative anomalies that justify 
evaluation and an in-depth audit).  
 
Table 2.13. Tax Expenditures in Selected Latin American Countries 


















Argentina2 2001 17.3 3.0 36.1 63.9 17.5 
 2003 19.6 2.5 32.7 67.3 12.8 
 2004 22.6 2.4 27.4 72.6 10.5 
 20054 22.4 2.6 28.6 71.4 11.4 
Brazil2,3   20011 13.5 1.5 66.7 16.7 11.1 
 2002 15.3 1.8 65.2 34.8 11.6 
 2003 16.0 1.7 65.3 34.7 10.6 
 2004 16.5 1.4 68.6 31.4 8.5 
Chile 1998 17.8 4.2 73.8 26.2 23.6 
 2002 18.1 4.2 74.0 26.0 23.2 
 20054 17.8 4.2 79.0 21.0 23.6 
Colombia 1998 14.4 7.4 35.0 65.0 51.4 
 1999 14.2 9.2   64.8 
Ecuador 2000 11.6 4.9 47.0 53.0 42.1 
Guatemala 2000 9.7 7.3 28.0 72.0 75.2 
Mexico2 2002 13.2 5.3 51.0 49.0 40.2 
 2003 12.6 6.3   50.0 
 20054 10.9 6.7   61.5 
Peru 2003 14.7 2.5 34.0 66.0 17.0 
Uruguay 19991 24.1 6.6 20.0 76.0 27.4 













18.5 7.5   40.5 
Netherlands 2002 39.2 2.4     6.1 
 
  Source: Gomez Sabaini (2005). “Evolución y situación tributaria actual en 
América Latina: Una serie de temas para la discusión.” 
  1The sum is less than 100% because there are tax expenditures included as other 
taxes. 
  2Does not include tax expenditures other than federal government. 
  3Direct taxes includes Income Tax. CSLL and CFSS. 
  4Forecasted. 
 
Some countries in the region have begun to include an official estimate of so-
called tax expenditures in their annual budgets, even when their comparison in time and 
among countries is limited by the different methodologies adopted and the quality of the 
data utilized. Therefore, Table 2.13 provides only a rough comparison of the magnitude 
of tax expenditures in the countries in the region, both relative to GDP and relative to 
total revenues. To illustrate this further, we include information on some OECD 
countries, where this type of tax expenditure also seems to be significant.  
In Table 2.14, we observe the disaggregation of the calculations for Argentina and 
the significance of tax expenditures related to VAT, which account for 50 percent of the 
total estimate. For this purpose, tax expenditures are defined as the amount of tax revenue 
that the government set aside to obtain as a consequence of a special treatment to specific 
areas, economic sectors, or certain taxpayers. Estimates of tax expenditures are computed 
on a cash basis, meaning that the revenue loss is only related to the fiscal year. 
The information presented leads us to enquire about the consequences of 
promotion regimes in force in the region during the last decade; further studies of these 
expenditures are clearly needed.  
 
Table 2.14. Tax Expenditures in Argentina 














TOTAL 9437 2.51 10096 2.37 12157 2.55 
Included in the tax laws 7360 1.96 8040 1.89 8946 1.88 
Included in incentives laws 2077 0.55 2056 0.48 3211 0.67 
 
VAT 4493 1.20 4941 1.16 5924 1.24 
Included in the tax laws 3115 0.83 3709 0.87 4103 0.86 
Included in incentives laws 1378 0.37 1232 0.29 1821 0.38 
 
INCOME 2254 0.60 1767 0.42 2392 0.50 
Included in the tax laws 2122 0.56 1640 0.39 1765 0.37 
Included in specific incentives laws 132 0.04 127 0.03 627 0.13 
 
FUELS 1287 0.34 1662 0.39 1910 0.40 




763 0.20 935 0.22 1067 0.22 




253 0.07 315 0.07 336 0.07 
Included in incentives laws 253 0.07 315 0.07 336 0.07 
 
PERSONAL GOODS 44 0.01 59 0.01 62 0.01 
Included in the tax laws 44 0.01 59 0.01 62 0.01 
       
EXCISES 30 0.01 34 0.01 38 0.01 




90 0.02 21 0.01 24 0.01 
Included in incentives laws 90 0.02 21 0.01 24 0.01 
 
OTHERS 224 0.06 362 0.09 403 0.08 
Included in incentives laws 224 0.06 362 0.09 403 0.08 
 
  Source: Dirección Nacional de Investigaciones y Análisis Fiscal. 
 
Need to Strengthen Fairness and Equity of the System  
 
Income inequality has increased in this area since the Second World War, and since the 
1990s this tendency has not been uniform among countries. On average, inequality has 
increased in South America but has remained stable in Central America and the 
Caribbean, as we can observe in Table 2.15. Evidence suggests that there is a converging 
movement towards unequal income in the entire region. We can likewise observe that 
among the countries included here, Argentina is the country with the highest increase in 
inequality (measured through Gini coefficients), moving from third place in the early 
1990s to seventh place in the region at the beginning of the current decade.  
 
Table 2.15. Gini Coefficients: Distribution of Equivalent Family Income  












Argentina 0.426 0.458 0.504 0.078 
Bolivia 0.543 0.558 0.559 0.016 
Brazil 0.595 0.583 0.572 -0.023 
Chile 0.547 0.549 0.561 0.014 
Colombia 0.559 0.543 0.558 -0.001 
Costa Rica 0.439 0.440 0.446 0.007 
El Salvador 0.505 0.494 0.518 0.013 
Honduras 0.556 0.541 0.530 -0.026 
Jamaica 0.496 0.515 0.490 -0.006 
México 0.539 0.525 0.527 -0.012 
Nicaragua 0.542 n/a 0.541 -0.001 
Panamá 0.547 0.540 0.544 -0.003 
Perú 0.457 0.464 0.477 0.020 
Uruguay 0.408 0.409 0.425 0.017 
Venezuela 0.417 0.445 0.455 0.038 
 
Simple average 0.505 0.507 0.514 0.009 
Weighted 
average 
0.519 0.512 0.515 -0.004 
 
Rep. Dominicana  0.502 0.481  
Ecuador  0.530 0.543  
Guatemala  n/a 0.560  
Paraguay  0.578 0.549  
 
  Source: Gasparini (2003). 
 
 It is a well known fact that in Latin America, the effects of the tax system on 
income distribution have always been an issue that presents great conceptual and 
methodological problems. Perceptions of the role of taxation on income have not only 
changed during the past decades, but the effects of taxation policies continue to be 
discussed, since many studies of such policies have encountered great conceptual and 
empirical limitations. 
Answering the question “Who pays taxes?” is difficult, despite the decades of 
work in this field.18 As indicated further along, a more optimistic message can be 
obtained from the economic policy viewpoint:  it is more convenient to analyze the 
marginal effects of tax reforms than to look at the average of existing structures. 
In the case of Argentina, several studies indicate that progressiveness has declined over 
the years – trend that is contrary to expected changes in income distribution.19 In this 
sense the ‘tax structure’ is the most important factor which determines this result, since 
taxes on income are basically progressive and taxes on consumer goods are not. Although 
the global level of taxation has increased throughout the last few decades, as indicated 
previously, taxes on income have not evolved accordingly. Thus, given the relatively low 
burden of taxes on personal income, distributive effects of the tax system have been low, 
and the evidence shows that no redistribution changes have been produced as a result.  
This poses a question regarding the ability of the tax system to capture an 
increasing percentage of revenues through taxes on personal income, selective taxes on 
luxury items, or equity taxes. In this respect, the orientation of changes in the Argentine 
tax system has not been favorable. 
Taxes on personal income have not increased; in fact, they have decreased 
slightly, since taxable bases did not expand at the same time as tax rates dropped. 
Likewise, we have observed a growing participation of general consumer taxes (VAT), 
which have suffered a process of taxable base expansion as well as a sustained increase in 
the overall tax rate. Selective taxes have concentrated on items of low price flexibility 
(beverages, tobacco, etc.), whereas taxes on luxury items were eliminated. Lastly, 
taxation on equity has been low, as coverage of these taxes is reduced, in the case of 
fixed assets valuation does not match market price and collection coefficients are not 
adequate.  
 Table 2.16 shows the results of the 1997 tax distribution incidence, based on 
studies of the Argentine case. This demonstrates the existence of a regressive tax system, 
in contrast with the behavior of industrialized countries. 
 
Table 2.16. Tax Burden in Income Deciles for the Entire Tributary System, 
Argentina 1997 
 
Percentage of cases corresponding  
















11.34 16.30 13.78 8.19 
Wealth taxes 2.83 2.21 2.41 3.36 
Goods and Services 19.59 25.93 20.81 17.76 
Foreign Trade 1.66 2.30 1.76 1.51 
Other Taxes 2.07 3.03 2.23 1.81 
Total 42.391 52.29 44.06 39.80 
 
  Source: Santiere. Gómez Sabaini y Rossignolo (2000). 
  1The Average Tax Burden of the System is 42.39%, a particularly high figure, as a 
result of several factors, among which we note- (i) the tax concept adopted 
encompasses more that is usual in other investigations; (ii) the GDP  suffered a 
reduction in the recent  National Accounts estimate; (iii) the definition of Family 
Available Net Income is notably more restricted that the one applied in previous 
investigations; (iv) in every case, Available Income is a figure that reflects values 
that are much lower than GDP and therefore, tax pressure in respect of GDP 
(conventional tax burden) has to be lower than the quotient between the same mass 
of taxes and Available Income. 
 
The information gathered allows us to define a slightly regressive tax system, 
with a tendency towards proportionality. This definition is confirmed by estimates of the 
inequality index which, in the case of the Gini, increases its value when inequality grows. 
The proportionality condition is not positive from the point of view of equality, because 
we expect a developed tax system to comply with the requirement for vertical equality, 
according to which those with larger incomes should face a higher tax burden than those 
with lower incomes. In other words: we would expect the tax/income quotient to be lower 
on average in the lowest income groups and higher than average in the groups with 
higher economic capacity. This condition did not prove true in Argentina in 1997. 
Lastly, we must indicate that investigations on the matter of tax distribution 
conducted in Argentina have, actually, been limited to the evaluation of several taxes 
(VAT, income, etc.), but the first overall effort dates back to 1965 and was part of the 
general analysis of taxation in the country. Then, the average tax burden (taxes / family 
income) was 19.5 percent and individualized by sectors showed a relative proportionality 
around the mean, with a small increase in the last section. The second study takes data 
centered on the year 1986 (Santiere 1989). The methodology of this study was to analyze 
the tax burden on different deciles of the population, as classified by their income levels. 
In 1999, Santiere and Gómez Sabaini recalculated the year 1986 to make it as compatible 
as possible with the methodology employed and allow dynamic comparison with the 
studies in 1993 and 1997. The analysis of this eleven-year period served to demonstrate 
the regressiveness of the Argentine tax system in regards to the selected well-being 
indicator, total family income. The trend is more marked in 1993 and 1997. 
Towards the end of 1998, an investigation was published by Leonardo Gasparini 
who, after elaborating an extensive series of alternatives, presented a wholly regressive 
system in reference to per capita family income, which is slightly more progressive if the 
well-being pattern adopted is the family’s or individual’s global consumption. 
The above-mentioned endeavors and their results offer a rather coherent picture, 
leaving us with little doubt as to the regressiveness of the tax package in force in 
Argentina, always taking into account that the contrast variable is available income. 
Finally, the latest investigations confirm renewed interest in the distribution and equality 
aspects of the taxation system, following a period in which this matter was largely 
ignored and attention was paid to the phenomena of automatic development of the 
economy, globalization, and other aspects related to economic policy. 
 
Strengthening of the Tax Administration   
 
The weakness of the tax administration has always been one of the main problems 
affecting the Argentine taxation system, and the response to this issue has been the least 
positive. This weakness is evident in the sphere of provincial tax administration (twenty-
four jurisdictions) and even more so when one examines municipal tax administration 
(1500 municipalities).  
To this end, the Argentine government set up the Federal Agency for Public 
Income (AFIP) in 1997 and took over unified control of national taxes (domestic 
resources, social security, and customs duties), following the guidelines viewed at the 
time as a solution for all Latin American tax administrations. The AFIP, which employs 
nearly 20,000 people, was granted administrative independence and its budget was 
financed by a predetermined percentage of the entity’s total revenues.  
A decade after its establishment, it is significant that one of AFIP’s future 
objectives is to deepen the process of integration among its constitutive entities, since 
uniting the General Tax Bureau (DGI) and the General Customs Bureau/DGA) has still 
been more of a proposal than a fact. 
 Together with these administrative measures, the administration was supported 
by legal regulations that allowed for the honorable exit of a great mass of contributors 
who were not subject to any type of control by the entity, both regarding their statement 
and payment of income tax and compliance with social security obligations. With this in 
mind, legislation was passed on the ‘Monotributista regime,’ which consisted of a fixed-
payment system that accorded different levels or categories under which contributors 
were enrolled. The payment system was a substitute for all other taxes (personal income 
tax, VAT, and social security contributions) and currently encompasses 1,200,000 cases, 
over which the AFIP wields minimum controls. This system, seemingly benign, is one of 
the most serious problems faced by the tax system, as it has permitted the incorporation 
of a mass of potential income tax and VAT contributors, which affects both the equality 
and the economic efficiency of the system.  
In the past few years, it is noticeable that tax administrators, not only in 
Argentina, but in Latin America as a whole, have consistently placed the weight of tax 
administration on controlling VAT compliance. In this regard, we observe that countries 
have invested large amounts of money to improve tax compliance – and perhaps tax 
evasion is in decline – however, investigation of this phenomenon is limited. Tax non-
compliance involves the performance of illegal actions, with the purpose of reducing tax 
payments, defined as evasion, and the temporary deferment of payments, known as 
arrears. Although arrears imply a delay in the availability of funds for the state, evasion 
results in the loss of state revenues and inequality in the distribution of the tax burden. 
This generates disloyal competition among evaders and those who are in compliance, as 
well as the inefficient distribution of economic resources. In order to estimate VAT 
compliance, the AFIP20 calculated potential revenues, corresponding to VAT revenues 
that would have been collected if all those responsible had liquidated and paid their 
obligations in full and compared it to revenues actually collected. Through this 
methodology, potential revenues were determined by adding VAT contained in purchases 
that do not generate fiscal credit – that is, end consumer purchases and those of 
contributors who are tax-exempt or to whom this tax does not apply. During the period 
examined, non-compliance reached a maximum of 34.8 percent in 2002. Between 2003 
and 2004, there was a marked drop in non-compliance, and last year, VAT non-
compliance was 24 percent, the lowest in the series (Table 2.17).21 
 
Table 2.17. Estimation of VAT Evasion1. Potential and Effective revenues. 
(In thousands of Pesos) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Potential Revenues (A) 24,281,104 22,651,886 24,305,698 31,821,691 38,542,803
Adjusted Effective Revenues (B) 17,507,175 15,951,530 15,836,045 21,545,103 28,992,953
Evasion (C=A-B) 6,773,929 6,700,356 8,469.653 10,276,588 9,549,850
Evasion in percentage 
(D)=(C)/(A)*100 
27.9 29.6 34.8 32.3 24.8
 
  Source: AFIP (2005). “Estimación del incumplimiento en el IVA, Años 2000 a 2004.” 
  1Including tax arrears. 
 
The improvement in tax compliance is mainly the result of two factors: the 
procyclicity of tax collection and the increased efficiency of the tax administration. Increase 
in tax revenues tends to follow closely intensified economic activity, if all other variables 
conditioning this activity hold stable (tax rates, taxable base scope, etc.)  The second factor 
is the group of new measures implemented by the tax administration to reduce non-
compliance.  
 













































There are several imbalances that affect the Argentine taxation system. First, the public 
sector’s financial situation has become highly unstable due to erratic revenues and its 
dependence on the economic cycle. Second, a structure which leans too heavily on direct 
taxation and which is extremely ‘allergic’ to taxing personal income and equity, affects the 
equality vital to any tax system.  
Additionally, the disorderly process of decentralizing expenses towards sub-national 
jurisdictions with significant productive development differences has resulted in an 
accentuated lack of correspondence between expenses and income at the federal level. This 
has been resolved by a significant dependence of asset transfer systems between 
jurisdictions that are not sufficiently transparent. Likewise, we see a predominance of 
exception mechanisms which, under the relatively light burden of income tax, have been 
granted to VAT and thus lead to severe inefficiency in the assignment of resources.  
Lastly, the great significance of the informal economy, added to the weakness of the 
administration both at the state and provincial tax levels, not only involves the loss of 
resources, but also aggravates existing differences in equality and domestic competitiveness.  
Specifically, throughout this work, eight main features of the present situation and 
six main challenges facing Argentina’s tax system have been identified. In summary, the 
main characteristics or stylized factors quoted are: 
a. sustained growth of consumers taxes; 
b. gradual loss of resources from import duties; 
c. intermittent but significant presence of export taxes; 
d. poor performance of income taxation; 
e. irrelevance of wealth taxes; 
f. importance of payroll taxes; 
g. the use of emergency or extraordinary taxes; and  
h. the importance of tax expenditures. 
 
Finally, the main challenges ahead that have been identified in relation to the 
Argentine tax system are:  
a. financing of the social security system and its effects at the different levels of 
government; 
b. replacement of emergency taxes on corporate assets and taxes on financial 
operations; 
c. the substitution of export taxes; 
d. the reduction of tax expenditures; 
e. the need to strengthen the fairness of the system; and  
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